The CEO says the Ends are impossible.
The board hears resistance. The CEO hears arithmetic.
Carver and Charney place that conflict before an arts council in rehearsal 3.16. The board has required results that the CEO believes available resources cannot produce.[1]
I would not begin by defending the policy or questioning the CEO’s commitment. I would ask for evidence.
What interpretation of the End is the CEO using?
Which measures show the gap?
What resources and assumptions are involved?
When does noncompliance become likely?
A CEO has a duty to report actual or anticipated noncompliance. That report gives the board information it cannot create from the board table. It does not transfer the Ends decision to the CEO.
The board decides what results should exist, for whom, and at what worth. The CEO can explain feasibility, recommend options, and show consequences. The board may keep the End, narrow it, change its priority, extend the time, or pursue more resources.
Until the policy changes, the CEO remains accountable to it.
That sentence needs care. A board should not use accountability to demand magic. If credible evidence shows that the assignment cannot be performed within lawful and prudent means, the board owns the contradiction. Character requires the board to change something rather than praise aspiration and punish reality.
The reverse risk matters too. A CEO may label an End unrealistic because it requires a different strategy, harder choices, or a result that has never been produced before. Difficulty is not proof of impossibility. The board should test assumptions and may seek independent evidence before reducing an important result.
BoardSource advises that chief executive goals should be realistic in relation to available resources.[2] Policy Governance adds a useful distinction: the CEO interprets and executes; the board sets the value and worth. Fairness requires both voices without confusing them.
I would put three options in the minutes.
Keep the End and accept the stated risk.
Change the End or its priority.
Change the resource expectation.
Then assign monitoring dates and evidence to the choice.
The board should also talk with owners. An arts council may discover that the community values a broader reach more than depth, or the reverse. Funding may follow the value conversation, but the board should not promise revenue that owners have not signaled a willingness to provide.
There is no formula that removes judgment. Data can show cost and probability. It cannot decide which good matters most. That is why the board exists.
The board should also protect the CEO from a hidden penalty. If trustees choose to keep an End after receiving credible warnings, the later evaluation should reflect the board’s choice and the CEO’s response, not pretend the warning was never given. Did the CEO present the evidence early, propose reasonable means, protect the organization, and report performance honestly? Those are fair questions.
Do not let “unrealistic” become a permanent stalemate. Set a date for decision, name the additional information required, and record who will gather it. The organization cannot plan while its governing result sits in dispute.
You can rehearse this before a CEO brings bad news. Choose one ambitious End and ask what evidence would persuade the board that it is infeasible. If members cannot answer, the CEO is being asked to disprove a belief.
Bold Ends can call an organization forward.
They should never become a hiding place for a board that refuses to count the cost.
Footnotes
[1] Miriam Carver and Bill Charney, The Board Member’s Playbook (Jossey-Bass, 2004), rehearsal 3.16, pages 84–87.
[2] BoardSource, “Performance Goals for the Chief Executive”.
Additional reading
John Carver’s Boards That Make a Difference provides the fuller framework for Ends and their worth.
Richard P. Chait, William P. Ryan, and Barbara E. Taylor’s Governance as Leadership helps boards work with the value questions that data cannot settle.